

## Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 167924  
ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 ERDA-07 AF-10 ARA-14 CIAE-00  
DODE-00 EA-09 EUR-12 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-03  
NASA-02 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-02  
PRS-01 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-15 DHA-02 NSCE-00 SSO-00  
/157 R

DRAFTED BY ACDA/PA:JMPOPE:HL  
APPROVED BY ACDA/PA:PASANJUAN  
-----119019 192018Z /63

P 191819Z JUL 77  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY  
INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 167924

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, SOPN

SUBJECT: JULY 19 PRESS ROUNDUP

PLEASE PASS TO AMB PAUL C. WARNKE

1. BERNARD GWERTZMAN OF NEW YORK TIMES REPORTED THAT  
PRESIDENT HAS QUIETLY APPROVED FORMATION OF INTERAGENCY  
COMMITTEE UNDER STATE DEPARTMENT TO COORDINATE POLICIES  
TOWARD SOVIET UNION. GWERTZMAN SAID AS DISCLOSED BY OF-  
FICIALS PURPOSE OF GROUP WILL BE TO GIVE PRESIDENT,  
PARTICULARLY DURING THIS PERIOD OF STRAINS IN RELATIONS,  
BEST POSSIBLE ADVICE ON SOVIET AFFAIRS AND TO INSURE THAT  
VARIOUS AGENCIES ARE COORDINATING THEIR RELATIONS WITH  
RUSSIANS. GROUP, WHICH WAS DECIDED UPON LAST WEEK, WILL  
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 167924

HAVE TITLE OF INTERAGENCY COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON U.S.-  
SOVIET AFFAIRS, WITH INITIALS I.C.C.U.S.A. GWERTZMAN SAID  
CO-CAIRMEN WILL BE MARSHALL D. SHULMAN, WHO IS VANCE'S  
ADVISER ON SOVIET AFFAIRS, AND GEORGE S. VEST, ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS. ACDA WILL BE ONE OF  
AGENCIES REPRESENTED ON COMMITTEE, WHICH, GWERTZMAN SAID,  
WOULD NOT BE INVOLVED IN MAKING POLICY ON SUCH SENSITIVE  
ISSUES AS LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS, BUT WOULD INSURE THAT  
NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIANS ON EXCHANGE PROGRAMS AND OTHER  
ISSUES SUCH AS TRADE DID NOT TAKE PLACE IN POLICY VACUUM.

GWERTZMAN SAID "THIS IS FIRST TIME TO OFFICIALS' KNOWLEDGE THAT INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE HAS BEEN CREATED TO COORDINATE POLICY TOWARD PARTICULAR COUNTRY. ITS FORMATION REFLECTS PRIORITY GIVEN TO RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION, WHICH HAVE BEEN MARRED BY SOVIET REACTION TO MR. CARTER'S HUMAN RIGHTS STATEMENTS AND TO HIS PROPOSALS ON REDUCING STRATEGIC ARMS. OFFICIALS SAID CREATION OF GROUP WAS NOT ADMISSION THAT POLICY HAD NOT BEEN HANDLED WELL BEFORE, BUT THAT WAS CONCLUSION LIKELY TO BE DRAWN."

2. WALL STREET JOURNAL, IN LENGTHY ARTICLE BY ROBERT KEATLEY ENTITLED "DECLINE OF DETENTE," SAID WASHINGTON OFFICIALS CHARGED WITH WATCHING MOSCOW MOVES AND PARSING KREMLIN STATEMENTS THINK "U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS HAVE DETERIORATED MARKEDLY SINCE MR. CARTER TOOK OFFICE AND THAT THINGS COULD GET MUCH WORSE. YET THEY DON'T FIND ANY CRISIS SO FAR." KEATLEY SAID ROUTINE RELATIONS CONTINUE SOMEWHERE BETWEEN CORRECT AND CORDIAL, BUT "WHAT'S MORE IMPORTANT, BREAKTHROUGH LATE THIS YEAR ON BIG ITEM OR TWO -- NOTABLY STALLED STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS -- REMAINS ACHIEVABLE. SUCH SUCCESS COULD MAKE CURRENT PROBLEMS ONLY TRANSIENT." KEATLEY QUOTED ONE OF ADMINISTRATION'S TOP EXPERTS ON SOVIET UNION AS SAYING "IT IS UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 167924

QUITE POSSIBLE THAT IF WE GET SALT AGREEMENT IN 1977, THIS COULD ALL STABILIZE. BOTH SIDES STILL NEED IT, AND IF WE CAN ACT RATIONALLY, WE CAN ESTABLISH WORKMANLIKE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US." KEATLEY SAID "ONE COMMONLY CITED ITEM IS WAY WASHINGTON PRESENTED ITS RADICAL NEW SALT PROPOSALS TO MOSCOW WHEN SECRETARY VANCE VISITED THERE LAST MARCH. AS MR. BRZEZINSKI HAS EXPLAINED IT, U.S. DELIBERATELY BY-PASSED CONSERVATIVE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY AND PUT THESE IDEAS DIRECTLY TO MR. BREZHNEV IN HOPES THAT HE WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY AND DECISIVELY. ESSENTIALLY, PROPOSALS SOUGHT EXTRA 25 PERCENT CUT IN ARMS BEYOND THAT TENTATIVELY AGREED ON, AS WELL AS STRICT NEW CONTROLS ON MODERNIZATION OF WEAPONS. THIS WAS MEANT AS BARGAINING OFFER, BUT SOVIET OFFICIALS CHOSE TO VIEW IT AS ULTIMATUM AND REJECTED IT FIRMLY. THEY THEN BEGAN LOUD COMPLAINTS ABOUT AMERICAN DEMANDS FOR 'ONE-SIDED ADVANTAGES' AND HAVEN'T STOPPED YET. MANY U.S. OFFICIALS, WITHOUT CRITICIZING GOALS, SAY SUCH DRASTIC NEW IDEAS SHOULD ALWAYS BE FUNNELED THROUGH PONDEROUS SOVIET BUREAUCRACY. IF SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IS WANTED, THEY ADDED, SUCH PROPOSALS SHOULD NEVER REACH AGED POLITBURO WITHOUT DETAILED MOSCOW STAFF WORK IN ADVANCE. 'ONE WAY TO ENSURE FAILURE IS TO TRY TO AVOID MILITARY BUREAUCRACY' THAT ANALYZES SALT PROPOSALS, INSISTS DIMITRI SIMES, SOVIET EMIGRE WHO IS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY'S CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES. MANY SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS AGREE. MEETING IN MAY BETWEEN MR. VANCE AND SOVIET FOREIGN

MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO PRODUCED VAGUE FORMULA ABOUT HOW TO CONTINUE ARMS TALKS, BUT NOTHING SUBSTANTIVE HAS HAPPENED SINCE. AND NO SERIOUS SEARCHES FOR COMPROMISE ARE EXPECTED BEFORE SEPTEMBER. DELAY ALMOST GUARANTEES THAT PRESENT OFFENSIVE ARMS CONTROLS WILL EXPIRE BEFORE NEW ONES ARE DRAFTED. THAT PROSPECT NEED NOT PRESENT ANY SERIOUS MILITARY THREAT, BUT IT SYMBOLIZES CONTENTIOUS STATE OF POLITICAL RELATIONS." KEATLEY SAID MANY U.S. DIPLOMATS BELIEVE THAT "MOSCOW STILL WANTS SALT TREATY, UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 167924

PARTLY BECAUSE IT FEARS INTENSIFIED ARMS RACE AT TIME WHEN U.S. SEEMS TO BE PULLING AHEAD AGAIN -- PARTICULARLY WITH NEW EMPHASIS ON CRUISE MISSILES. BY YEAR-END, MANY OFFICIALS HERE EXPECT RELATIVELY MODEST NEW PACT TO BE READY, OR NEARLY SO, WITH FIRM COMMITMENTS ABOUT DEEPER CUTS LATER. MOREOVER, SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEGUN ABOUT BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTING AND ABOUT REDUCING OR REMOVING FORCES IN INDIAN OCEAN, POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOT. THERE IS ALSO TALK OF WORKING OUT SPECIFIC GROUND RULES TO LIMIT U.S.-SOVIET COMPETITION IN FRINGE AREAS SUCH AS AFRICA. MR. CARTER HAD HOPED TO DISCUSS SUCH CONCEPTS -- AND EXPLAIN HIMSELF BETTER -- IN DIRECT TALKS WITH PRESIDENT BREZHNEV THIS SUMMER, BUT SOVIET LEADER REFUSED. MR. BREZHNEV HAS MAINTAINED FOR MONTHS THAT NEXT SUMMIT MUST BE HELD TO COMPLETE SALT TREATY AND MUST AVOID CREATING FALSE EXPECTATIONS."

3. NEWSWEEK IN JULY 25 ISSUE PUBLISHED INTERVIEW WITH U.S. AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW MALCOLM TOON. TOON TOLD NEWSWEEK CORRESPONDENT FRED COLEMAN THAT "SALT IN MANY WAYS IS LINCHPIN OF DETENTE AS SOVIETS PERCEIVE IT. IF WE ARE NOT SUCCESSFUL IN MAKING PROGRESS ON SALT THEN I THINK WE WILL SEE DECIDED COOLING OF OUR RELATIONS, EVEN MORE SO THAN WE HAVE SEEN IN LAST SIX MONTHS. WHAT ARE PROSPECTS OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON SALT? IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ANYONE TO SAY AT MOMENT. WE DID HAVE SUCCESSFUL MEETING IN GENEVA IN SENSE THAT WE WORKED OUT FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS. WE DID HAVE SOME DISCUSSION OF ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE BETWEEN US, BUT FRANKLY WE DIDN'T GET VERY FAR INTO THIS. SO MAJOR PART OF JOB LIES AHEAD OF US. I THINK WE WOULD JUST BE KIDDING OURSELVES IF WE DID NOT RECOGNIZE THAT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US ON THESE GUT ISSUES ARE VERY WIDE INDEED." COLEMAN ASKED "IF SALT DOESN'T UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 STATE 167924

WORK OUT, HOW WOULD FURTHER COOLING OF RELATIONS MANIFEST ITSELF?" TOON REPLIED "FAILING AGREEMENT ON SALT, WE WOULD HAVE TO SEEK OTHER WAYS TO SAFEGUARD OUR SECURITY ON BOTH SIDES. IT'S IMPORTANT TO POINT OUT THAT EVEN IF

WE FAIL TO REACH AGREEMENT BY OCT. 3 -- AND I THINK AGREEMENT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY GIVEN PRESENT CONDITIONS -- WE SHOULD NOT PANIC. THERE'S NO REASON FOR US TO ASSUME THAT THAT MEANS END OF WORLD, OF NEGOTIATIONS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF IN FACT WE ARE TALKING AT TIME, THEN THERE MUST BE SOME MECHANISM WE CAN FIND TO AT LEAST ASSUME THAT SALT ONE WOULD REMAIN IN EFFECT AND THAT WE DON'T HAVE TO RESORT TO EXTREME MEASURES."

4. NEW YORK TIMES REPORTED THAT SENATORS CULVER AND EAGLETON CRITICIZED ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION TO SELL SEVEN ADVANCED AIRBORNE RADAR WARNING SYSTEMS TO IRAN. THEY SAID SALE WOULD THREATEN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND WOULD VIOLATE TENETS OF PRESIDENT'S POLICY SEEKING TO CURB SALE OF ARMS ABROAD. APPEARING BEFORE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, CULVER AND EAGLETON SAID SALE OF AWACS -- WHICH ARE EQUIPPED WITH SECRET TECHNOLOGY -- POSES SECURITY RISK THAT SECRET INFORMATION MAY FALL INTO SOVIET HANDS. CONGRESS HAS UNTIL AUGUST 5 TO VETO SALE IF IT CAN MUSTER MAJORITY OF VOTES IN BOTH HOUSES. BERNARD WEINRAUB, TIMES CORRESPONDENT, SAID PROSPECTS SEEM SLIM. CULVER AND EAGLETON, IN URGING CONGRESS TO OVERTURN DEAL, SAID ITS IMPLICATIONS HAD NOT BEEN FULLY ANALYZED BY CIA OR ACDA. CULVER SAID "BULK OF POLICY JUSTIFICATION OFFERED BY DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN SUPPORT OF THIS SALE WAS IN FACT PREPARED BY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. POLICY JUSTIFICATION IS INADEQUATE."

5. TIMES ALSO REPORTED THAT SENATE SUPPORTED PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO HALVE PRODUCTION OF B-ONE BOMBER, BY TRIMMING 1.4 BILLION DOLLARS FOR THE PLANES FROM DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL.  
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 06 STATE 167924

6. TIME MAGAZINE IN JULY 25 ARTICLE ENTITLED 'YELLOW LIGHT FOR NEUTRON BOMB,' SAID, BEFORE CARTER MAKES ANY FINAL DECISION -- PROBABLY LATE NEXT MONTH -- HE WILL STUDY REPORTS FROM BOTH PENTAGON, WHICH WILL CERTAINLY RECOMMEND GO-AHEAD, AND ACDA, WHOSE DUTY IT IS TO ANALYZE IMPACT OF ANY NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. DRAFT REPORT FROM ACDA SAYS NEUTRON BOMB -- AT LEAST TYPE CARRIED IN EIGHT-INCH ARTILLERY SHELLS -- WOULD NOT APPRECIABLY AFFECT SALT TALKS. AT THIS POINT, CARTER APPEARS TO HAVE BOUGHT ARGUMENT;

7. WALTER PINCUS OF WASHINGTON POST SAID FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER WAS NOT AWARE OF FORD ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION LAST NOVEMBER TO PRODUCE NEW GENERATION OF NEUTRON WEAPONS FOR USE BY NATO FORCES. KISSINGER, ACCORDING TO INFORMED SOURCES QUOTED BY PINCUS, AS SAID THAT DIFFICULT DIPLOMATIC PROBLEMS WOULD BE RAISED BY DEPLOYMENT TO NATO COUNTRIES OF NEUTRON ARTILLERY SHELLS

AND MISSILE WARHEADS. PINCUS STATED THAT KISSINGER'S REPORTED CONCERNS WERE ECHOED BY WHITE HOUSE AIDE WHO SAID U.S. BRIEFING OF NATO ALLIES ON NEUTRON WEAPONS LAST YEAR FOUND WEST GERMANS 'NOT TREMENDOUSLY ENTHUSIASTIC.' LAST WEEK NATO COMMANDER HAIG TOLD PRESS CONFERENCE ALLIES HAD GIVEN NEUTRON WEAPONS 'ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORT.' WEST GERMAN EMBASSY SPOKESMAN, PINCUS REPORTED, TOOK ISSUE WITH HAIG'S REMARKS, SAYING 'I COULD NOT AGREE AS FAR AS GERMAN SIDE IS CONCERNED. PUBLIC DISCUSSION ONLY NOW IS PICKING UP STEAM AND THERE IS NO CLEAR-CUT OPINION YET.' WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN, ACCORDING TO PINCUS, EMPHASIZED THAT NEUTRON ARTILLERY SHELLS AND LANCE MISSILE WARHEADS HAD BEEN CLASSIFIED SECRET PRIMARILY "TO PROTECT NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN" AND NOT TO HIDE THEIR PRODUCTION

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 07 STATE 167924

FROM U.S. OR EUROPEAN PUBLIC. KISSINGER REPORTEDLY BELIEVES THAT PUBLIC SENSITIVITY WOULD BE MORE SEVERE WITH NEUTRON WEAPONS SINCE THEY ARE SPECIFICALLY PLANNED FOR USE ON ALLIED SOIL. PUBLICITY ABOUT NEW NEUTRON WEAPONS, PINCUS SAID, HAS FORCED CARTER ADMINISTRATION TO CONDUCT SPECIAL STUDY OF WHAT WHITE HOUSE AIDE TERMED "QUESTIONS (THAT) PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THESE (NEUTRON) WARHEADS POSE." SENIOR POLICY OFFICIALS FROM STATE DEPARTMENT, ALONG WITH OFFICIALS OF ACDA, WILL BE CONSULTED, WHITE HOUSE AIDE TOLD PINCUS, ALTHOUGH PRIMARY AGENCIES INVOLVED ARE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AND ERDA, WHICH BUILDS NUCLEAR WARHEADS. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WILL PREPARE FINAL REPORT FOR PRESIDENT BY AUGUST 15. CARTER IS TO MAKE PRODUCTION DECISION AFTER REVIEWING THAT STUDY, PINCUS SAID. UNDER CURRENT PLANNING, DECISION TO DEPLOY WEAPONS, EVEN IF CARTER DECIDES TO GO AHEAD, WILL NOT BE DISCUSSED OFFICIALLY WITH NATO ALLIES UNTIL NEXT YEAR. VANCE

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 22-Sep-1999 12:00:00 am  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** PRESS SUMMARIES, POLITICAL SITUATION  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Sent Date:** 19-Jul-1977 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Date:** 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** n/a  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:**  
**Disposition Date:** 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1977STATE167924  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** ACDA/PA:JMPOPE:HL  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D770268-1031  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1977/newtext/t197707105/baaaetgw.tel  
**Line Count:** 255  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** 31058762-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ORIGIN ACDA  
**Original Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 18-Jan-2005 12:00:00 am  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 1725720  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** JULY 19 PRESS ROUNDUP  
**TAGS:** PARM, SOPN  
**To:** GENEVA INFO MBFR VIENNA  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/31058762-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009